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Abstract—We investigate the K-user many-to-one interference
channel with confidential messages in which the Kth user
experiences interference from all other K − 1 users, and is at
the same time treated as an eavesdropper to all the messages of
these users. We derive achievable rates and an upper bound on
the sum rate for this channel and show that the gap between
the achievable sum rate and its upper bound is log2(K − 1)
bits per channel use under very strong interference, when the
interfering users have equal power constraints and interfering
link channel gains. The main contributions of this work are:
(i) nested lattice codes are shown to provide secrecy when
interference is present, (ii) a secrecy sum rate upper bound is
found for strong interference regime and (iii) it is proved that
under very strong interference and a symmetric setting, the gap
between the achievable sum rate and the upper bound is constant
with respect to transmission powers.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a wireless environment, interference is always present.
Traditionally, interference is viewed as a harmful physical
phenomenon that should be avoided. Yet, from the secrecy
perspective, if interference is more harmful to an eavesdropper,
it can be a resource to protect confidential messages. To fully
appreciate and evaluate the potential benefit of interference
on secrecy, the fundamental model to study is the interference
channel with confidential messages. Indeed, this model with
two users has been studied extensively up to date, e.g., [1]–[6].
The case with more than two users, by comparison, is not
well explored. Difficulties in solving the K-user case, K ≥ 3,
exist in both the achievability and the converse. For achiev-
ability, there is no known scheme for the strong interference
regime. The strong interference scenario is usually dismissed
for the two-user case since the achievable secrecy rates are
much smaller than those achievable under weak interference
regime [2]. In contrast, the K-user strong interference case
is quite different, because the K − 1 interfering users can
in fact protect each other in the strong interference regime
and a substantial amount of secrecy rate can be achieved. The
conventional wisdom says in strong interference, the receiver
should remove the interference before decoding the intended
message. Yet, in secrecy problems, we have to face the
question on how to remove the interference when the receiver
is not supposed to decode the interference. This problem is
addressed in [7] for the case where all links are i.i.d. fading
under a continuous distribution, and interference alignment in
temporal domain leads to achievable rates. Yet, if the channel
is static, this method is not applicable and new methods are
needed.
In this aspect, progress in interference channel without
secrecy constraint points to the use of lattice codes, which
is essentially interference alignment in signal space. This
approach allows decoding the sum of interference without
knowing each component in it. Notable results include [8]
where lattice codes are used for interference alignment for
a many-to-one Gaussian interference channel. The same idea
also applies to a fully connected interference channel [9], [10].
In this work, we focus on the Gaussian many-to-one inter-
ference channel first studied in [8], in an effort to investigate
the effects of interference in the context of secrecy. We use
lattice codes to achieve secrecy for this model and use the tool
first introduced in [11] which computes secrecy rates when the
lattice code has a nested structure [12]. Notably, the structure
of the lattice we use differs from that used in interference
channels without secrecy constraints [8]–[10], and accordingly
so does its error probability analysis [12].
For the converse, known results are limited to the case
where the eavesdropper observes a weaker channel than the
legitimate receiver [3], [4]. The upper bound from [1] is
general, yet is difficult to evaluate for the Gaussian case due
to the presence of the auxiliary random variables. While the
upper bound in [2] is applicable to the strong interference case,
it is shown therein to be quite loose for strong interference,
mainly because the genie information used in deriving the
upper bound provides too much information to the legitimate
receiver. Another contribution of this work is providing a good
sum rate upper bound for the many-to-one interference channel
under strong interference.
Under very strong interference, we show that the gap
between our upper bound and our achievable sum rate is
log2(K−1) bits under certain uniform interference conditions.
We observe that in this setting, for fixed transmission power
P , the cost of secrecy constraints per user diminishes when
the number of users K →∞. This means that as the number
of users gets large, the secrecy constraints induce a negligible
rate penalty for each user, i.e., secrecy comes for free.
The following notation is used throughout the paper:
C(x) = 0.5 log2(1 + x). A1,...,K represents the set
{A1, A2, ..., AK}. ⊕
∑n
i=1Ai is used as a shorthand for
A1 ⊕A2...⊕An, and Rsum for
∑K
i=1Ri.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we provide the preliminaries related to nested
lattice codes, which will be useful in providing the achievable
rates in Section IV. Let Λ denote a lattice in RN [12], i.e., a set
of points which is a group closed under real vector addition.
The modulus operation x mod Λ is defined as x mod Λ = x−
argminy∈Λ d(x, y), where d(x, y) is the Euclidean distance
between x and y. The fundamental region of a lattice V(Λ) is
defined as the set {x : x mod Λ = x}.
Let t1, t2, ..., tK be K numbers taken from V(Λ). Then, we
have the following representation theorem:
Theorem 1:
K∑
k=1
tk is uniquely determined by
{T,
K∑
k=1
tk mod Λ}, where T is an integer such that
1 ≤ T ≤ KN .
Remark 1: The theorem is a purely algebraic result and
does not rely on the statistics of t1,...K . The case with K = 2
was proved in [11]. The proof here is similar and is hence
omitted due to the space limit. For K = 2, theorem 1 implies
that modulus operation looses at most one bit per dimension
of information if t1, t2 ∈ V .
III. SYSTEM MODEL
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Fig. 1. Many-to-one Gaussian interference channel. number of users K=3
We consider the many-to-one Gaussian interference channel
[8] in Figure 1. The average power constraint for node Si is Pi.
Zi, i = 1, ...,K are independent Gaussian random variables
with zero mean and unit variance. The channel gain of the
link between Si and Di is unity. The channel gain between
Si and DK is
√
ai.
Node Si sends a message Wi to node Di, while keeping it
secret from the other receivers. Hence, for W1,...,K−1, node
DK is viewed as an eavesdropper. Let the signal received by
DK over n channel uses be Y nK . The corresponding secrecy
constraint is given by:
lim
n→∞
1
n
H
(
W1,2,...,K−1|Y NK
)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
H (W1,2,...,K−1)
(1)
IV. ACHIEVABLE RATES
Without loss of generality, we assume there is a j, such that
ajPj ≤ aiPi, ∀i (2)
Theorem 2: Let K ≥ 3. Define Pmin =
min{P1, ..., PK−1}. If
aj > max
{(
PK + 1
Pj
)(
K − 2
K − 1 + Pmin
)
,
PK + 1
Pj
}
(3)
Then the following sum secrecy rate is achievable
Rsum = [(K − 2)Rmin − log2(K − 1)]+ +RK (4)
where Rmin = C(Pmin), RK = C(PK).
Proof: Let (Λ,Λc) denote a nested lattice structure in
R
N
, where Λc is the coarse lattice.
Node Si, i = 1, ...,K constructs its input to the channel
over N channel uses, XNi , as follows: The code book has
rate Ri and is composed of points ti ∈ Λi∩V(Λc,i). The first
K − 1 users use the same lattice. Hence we require Ri ≡ R,
Λi ≡ Λ, Λc,i ≡ Λc for i = 1...K − 1. Let di be the dithering
noise, which is uniformly distributed over V(Λc,i). We assume
the lattice is scaled properly such that
1
N
∫
x∈V(Λc,i)
dx
∫
x∈V(Λc,i)
‖di‖2 dx = 1 (5)
Let P = ajPj , where j is defined in (2). Define x ⊕ y as
x⊕ y = (x+ y) mod Λc. Further, define UNi and XNi as:
UNi = t
N
i ⊕ dNi , i = 1, ...,K − 1 (6)
UNK = (t
N
K + d
N
K) mod Λc,K (7)
XNi =
√
P√
ai
UNi , i = 1, ...,K − 1, XNK =
√
PKU
N
K (8)
In order for Di, i = 1, ...,K − 1 to correctly decode ti, based
on [12, Theorem 5], the probability of decoding error will go
to zero as N →∞, if
R ≤ C(Pi), i = 1, ...,K − 1 (9)
The signal received by DK over N channel uses is given by
Y NK =
√
P (
K−1∑
i=1
UNi ) +
√
PKU
N
K + Z
N
K (10)
Node DK decodes the interference first: It selects a constant
α and computes Yˆ NK as shown below [12]: Let γ =
√
PK/P .
Let Z ′NK = ZNK /
√
P .
Yˆ NK =(
α√
P
Y NK −
K−1∑
i=1
dNi ) mod Λc (11)
=(α(
K−1∑
i=1
UNi + γU
N
K + Z
′N
K )−
K−1∑
i=1
dNi ) mod Λc
(12)
=(
K−1∑
i=1
tNi + (α− 1)
K−1∑
i=1
UNi + α(γU
N
K + Z
′N
K ))) mod Λc
(13)
α is chosen so that the variance of the effective noise term
ZNeff =(α− 1) (
K−1∑
i=1
UNi ) + α(γU
N
K + Z
′N
K ) (14)
per dimension is minimized. Under the optimal α, the effective
noise variance is PXPNPX+PN , where PX = γ
2 + 1P =
PK+1
P .
PN = K − 1.
Clearly the effective noise ZNeff is not Gaussian. However,
UNi can be approximated with a Gaussian distribution as
shown below [12, (200)]:
fUN
i
(x) ≤ eNε(Λc,i)fON
i
(x) (15)
where Oi, i = 1, ...,K,∼ N (0, σ2i I), where σ2i is the av-
erage power per dimension of a random variable uniformly
distributed over the smallest ball covering V(Λc,i). ε (Λc,i) is
defined as [12, (67)]:
ε (Λc,i) = log
(
Ru,i
Rl,i
)
+
1
2
log 2pieG∗N +
1
N
(16)
where Ru,i, Rl,i are the covering radius and effective radius
of Λc,i respectively. G∗N is the normalized average power of
N -sphere and converges to 12pie as N → ∞. The lattice is
designed to be good for covering. Hence Ru,iRl,i → 1 as N →
∞. σ2i is bounded below [12, Lemma 6]1:
N
N + 2
≤ σ2i ≤
(
Ru,i
Rl,i
)2
(17)
Note that this approximation property in (15) is invariant under
scaling. This means for any c > 0, we have:
fcUN
i
(
xN
) ≤ eNε(Λc,i)fcON
i
(
xN
) (18)
In addition, for any two independent random variables
UN1 , U
N
2 that have the approximation property given by (15),
the probability density distribution of their sum can be ap-
proximated as
fUN
1
+UN
2
(
xN
) ≤ eNε(Λc,1)+Nε(Λc,2)fON
1
+ON
2
(
xN
) (19)
Define Z˜N as
Z˜N = (1− α)(
K−1∑
i=1
ONi ) + α(γO
N
K + Z
′N
K ) (20)
Based on the two properties described above, we find the
effective noise can be approximated by Z˜N as follows:
fZN
eff
(x) ≤ e(K−1)Nε(Λc)+Nε(Λc,K)fZ˜N (x) (21)
Node DK attempts to decode ⊕
∑K−1
i=1 ti. The approxima-
tion in (21) enables us to apply the analysis in [12, Theorem 5],
that the probability of decoding error will go to 0 as N →∞
when
R ≤ 0.5 log2
(
1
PXPN
PX+PN
)
= 0.5 log2
(
1
K − 1 +
P
PK + 1
)
(22)
1The PXPN
PX+PN
in [12, Lemma 6] corresponds to the average power per
dimension of Ui here.
After subtracting the interference, the remainder of the inter-
ference signal is
γUNK ⊕ Z ′NK (23)
We next show if
PK + 1 < P (24)
then this signal can be approximated by
γUNK + Z
′N
K (25)
by which we mean:
lim
N→∞
Pr((γUNK ⊕ Z ′NK ) 6= (γUNK + Z ′NK )) = 0 (26)
As N →∞, γUNK + Z ′NK can be approximated by γONK +
Z ′NK , such that
Pr
(
γUNK + Z
′N
K /∈ V (Λc)
)
≤ eNε(Λc,K) Pr (γONK + Z ′NK /∈ V (Λc)) (27)
Let µ = 1γ2+1/P =
P
PK+1
. Because the shaping lattice is
Poltyrev-good [12], if µ > 1, we have
Pr
(
γONK + Z
′N
K /∈ V (Λc)
) ≤ e−N(EP (µ)−oN (1)) (28)
where EP (µ) is the Poltyrev exponent defined in [12, (56)].
Since Ep(µ) is positive for µ > 1, we have the approximation
given in (25). Node DK then tries to decode tK from (25).
Based on [12, Theorem 5], the probability of decoding error
will go to zero as N →∞, if
RK < C(PK) (29)
In summary, there are three types of error events at the
destination:
1) E1: DK incorrectly decodes the modulus sum of the
interference.
2) E2: E1 does not occur; and (25) does not equal (23).
3) E3: E1, E2 do not occur; and DK incorrectly decodes
the lattice point tNK after subtracting the interference.
If (22), (24), (29) hold, then
lim
N→∞
Pr
(
3⋃
i=1
Ei
)
= lim
N→∞
3∑
i=1
Pr (Ei) = 0 (30)
Also (9) must be met in order for ti to be correctly decoded
at Di, i = 1, ...,K .
We next bound the mutual information leaked to the eaves-
dropper as follows.
H(tN1,...,K−1|Y NK , dNi , i = 1, ..,K) (31)
≥H(tN1,...,K−1|Y NK , XNK , ZNK , dNi , i = 1, ..,K) (32)
=H(tN1,...,K−1|
K−1∑
i=1
UNi , d
N
i , i = 1, ..,K) (33)
Let T is the integer in Theorem 1, which is used to recover∑K−1
i=1 U
N
i from ⊕
∑K−1
i=1 U
N
i . 1 ≤ T ≤ (K − 1)N . Then
(33) becomes:
H(tN1,...,K−1| ⊕
K−1∑
i=1
UNi , T, d
N
i , i = 1, ..,K) (34)
=H(tN1,...,K−1| ⊕
K−1∑
i=1
tNi , T ) (35)
≥H(tN1,...,K−1| ⊕
K−1∑
i=1
tNi )−H(T ) (36)
The first term in (36) can be bounded as follows:
H(tN1,...,K−1| ⊕
K−1∑
i=1
tNi ) =
K−1∑
j=1
H(tNj |tN1,...,j−1,⊕
K−1∑
i=1
tNi )
(37)
=
K−1∑
j=1
H(tNj | ⊕
K−1∑
i=j
tNi ) =
K−2∑
j=1
H(tNj ) = (K − 2)NR
(38)
Hence the mutual information leaked to the eavesdropper is
bounded as: I
(
tN1,...,K−1;Y
N
K , d
N
i , i = 1, ...,K
) ≤ N(R +
log2(K − 1))
With this preparation, we can now derive the secrecy rate.
We notice that when (9), (22), (24), (29) hold, node DK can
decode the modulus sum of the interference, and then decode
tK . Hence the channel can be viewed as composed of two
parts: one part is a direct link from SK to DK . The other
part is the orthogonal MAC wire-tap channel considered in
[4], where the main channel is composed of K−1 orthogonal
components, and the eavesdropper observes a MAC channel.
The signal received by the eavesdropper is the interference
received by DK . The difference is that this MAC wire-tap
channel has discrete inputs tN1 , ..., tNK−1. Each channel use in
this new channel corresponds to N channel uses of the original
channel. Following a similar argument in [13], for this equiv-
alent channel, the following secrecy rate (R1,e, ..., RK−1,e) is
achievable:
0 ≤ Ri,e ≤ H(tNi )− Ri,x, Ri,x ≥ 0, i = 1, ...,K − 1 (39)
K−1∑
i=1
Ri,x = I
(
tN1,...,K−1;Y
N
K , d
N
i , i = 1, ...,K
) (40)
Finally, it can also be verified that (3) holds, (24) is fulfilled
and (22) is looser than (9) and hence becomes redundant.
Under (3), R = C(Pmin), i = 1, ...,K − 1. The result in
the theorem follows by choosing Ri,x as
Ri,x =
N
K − 1(C(Pmin) + log2(K − 1)) (41)
Remark 2: When using nested lattice codes to this interfer-
ence channel, we had to overcome two difficulties: (1) The
error probability analysis in [12] requires the noise to be
Gaussian, while in an interference channel, the interference
plus noise is in general non-Gaussian. We managed to get
around this via the property that a good lattice code, after
dithering, “looks like” Gaussian noise [12]. (2) In the decoder
of a nested lattice code, a nonlinear modulus operation [12]
must be applied to the received signal. This operation causes
distortion to the signal even after the decoded part of the
signal is subtracted out and renders the use of layered encoding
and decoding in [10] not straightforward. This is resolved by
proving that the probability of having distortion in fact goes
to 0 as N →∞.
V. UPPER BOUND ON THE SECRECY SUM RATE
Assume ai ≥ 1, i = 1...K − 1. Let n be the total number
of channel uses. Define V n as: V n =
∑K−1
i=1
√
aiX
n
i + Z
n
K .
Then we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1:
nRsum ≤I
(
W1,...,K−1;Y
n
1,...,K−1
)− I (W1,...,K−1;V n)
+ I
(
XnK ;Y
n
K |Xn1,...,K−1
)
+ nε (42)
where limn→∞ ε = 0.
Proof Outline: The two user case (K = 2) has been
proved in [3, Appendix]. The same technique is used here to
prove Lemma 1. The derivation starts from [3, (41)], W1 being
replaced by W1,...,K−1, Y1 being replaced by Y1,...,K−1, X1
being replaced by X1,...,K−1, Y2 being replaced by YK . The
V n1 therein is replaced by V n. Then, we can prove
nRsum − nε ≤I
(
W1,...,K−1;Y
n
1,...,K−1
)− I (W1,...,K−1;V n)
+ I (W1,...,K−1;V
n|Y nK) + I (XnK ;Y nK)
(43)
It can then be shown, following a similar derivation to [3,
Appendix (46)-(57)], that
I (W1,...,K−1;V
n|Y nK) + I (XnK ;Y nK) ≤ I
(
XnK ;Y
n
K |Xn1,...,K−1
)
(44)
Hence we have (42).
Let V˜ n =
∑K−1
i=1
√
ai
c X
n
i +
√
1
cZ
n
K +
√
1− 1c Z˜nK , where
c = max{ai, i = 1, ...,K − 1}. Z˜nK is a length-n vector that
has the same distribution as ZnK but is independent from ZnK .
Then we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2:
Rsum ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
(
K−1∑
i=1
I(Xni ;Y
n
i )− I(Xn1,...,K−1; V˜ n))
+ lim
n→∞
1
n
I(XnK ;Y
n
K |Xn1,...,K−1) (45)
Proof Outline: Because V˜ n is a degraded version of V n,
from Lemma 1 and data processing inequality, we have
nRsum ≤I
(
W1,...,K−1;Y
n
1,...,K−1
)− I (W1,...,K−1; V˜ n)
+ I
(
XnK ;Y
n
K |Xn1,...,K−1
)
+ nε (46)
where limn→∞ ε = 0. Next, we extend the derivation in [4,
(58),(65)-(68)] to the first two terms, by replacing Y n with
Y n1,...,K−1. The derivation in [4, (58),(65)-(68)] corresponds
to the case of K − 1 = 2 here. It is important to note that
V˜ n is not the signal received by the eavesdropper. Hence the
channel is not equivalent to the channel considered in [4],
which has different secrecy constraints. However, as we have
shown above, the derivation in [4, (58),(65)-(68)] does not
invoke any secrecy constraint. Hence these steps can still be
applied here and we have the lemma.
Theorem 3: When ai ≥ 1, i = 1...K − 1, the sum secrecy
rate is upper bounded by
Rsum ≤
K∑
i=1
C (Pi)− C
(∑K−1
i=1 aiPi
(K − 1)c
)
(47)
where c = max{ai, i = 1...K − 1}.
Proof Outline: The theorem follows by evaluating the
bound in Lemma 2. This is done by extending [4, Theorem
4]. [4, Theorem 4] corresponds to the case with K − 1 = 3.
Let hi = ai/c, i = 1, ...,K − 1. Then it can be shown that
the first limit in (45) is upper bounded by
K−1∑
i=1
C (Pi) + C
(∑K−1
i=1 hiPi
K − 1
)
(48)
The main technique is the generalized entropy power in-
equality [14]. Since no secrecy constraint is invoked in its
derivation, its result is still applicable here. This, along with
the fact that I
(
XnK ;Y
n
K |Xn1,...,K−1
) ≤ nC(PK), gives us the
result in the theorem.
VI. COMPARISON OF THE ACHIEVABLE RATE AND THE
UPPER BOUND
When ai = a, Pi = Pmin, i = 1...K − 1, and the condition
on a given by (3) is fulfilled, the achievable secrecy sum rate,
given by Theorem 2, becomes
Rasum = [(K − 2)C(Pmin)− log2(K − 1)]+ + C(PK)
(49)
The upper bound on the secrecy sum rate, given by Theorem
3 becomes
Rubsum = (K − 2)C(Pmin) + C(PK) (50)
It is easy to see that the gap between upper bound and lower
bound is at most log2(K − 1) bits per channel use.
The cost in rate, paid by first each K − 1 users, following
from (41), is 1K−1 (C (Pmin) + log2 (K − 1)). We see that,
for fixed Pmin, this rate loss goes to 0 as K → ∞. This
observation is demonstrated in Figure 2.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have derived achievable secrecy rates for K
(K ≥ 3) user Gaussian many-to-one interference channel, and
an upper bound on the secrecy sum rate. The achievability
technique is general and applies to the full connected K-
user interference channel as well [15]. The converse utilizes
a combination of techniques in [3], [4]. Although both tech-
niques were designed for weak interference, we show their
combination provides a good sum rate upper bound for the
strong interference case.
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